
By HDNF Editorial Team
Editorial review: HDNF Communications Team
Haiti needs development that lasts
Haiti’s crisis is urgent. Families face insecurity, displacement, interrupted commerce, limited public services, and reduced access to food and income.
But urgency cannot become the only framework.
Relief is immediate. Development is lasting.
Security can create space. Development fills that space with productive work, trusted institutions, and local ownership.
The public record now shows two different funding tracks: a large international security effort and a much smaller dedicated prevention and stabilization line. They are not the same kind of money, and they are not directly equivalent. They serve different purposes. But placing them side by side helps explain the choices made in Haiti policy.
This is not an accusation against any force or government. It is a review of documented figures and their limits.
A long history of Haitians building freedom
Haitians are freedom fighters and independent-minded people. That tradition did not begin in 1804.
- Around 1679, Port-de-Paix: Historians associate Port-de-Paix with an early uprising, part of a longer tradition of resistance and marronage. The surviving documentation is limited, and sources describe those involved differently, so this date should be presented carefully.
- 1779, Savannah: The Chasseurs-Volontaires de Saint-Domingue, composed largely of free men of color from Saint-Domingue, fought with French forces during the Siege of Savannah. Their service formed part of the wider Atlantic history of Black military participation and resistance. Museum of the American Revolution, “Brothers in Liberty”
- 1791, Bois Caïman: A clandestine gathering became a lasting symbol of organization, spiritual authority, and collective resistance at the beginning of the Haitian Revolution.
- 1804, Independence: Haiti became an independent nation after a thirteen-year revolution against colonial rule and slavery.
The historical lesson is clear: Haitians have never lacked courage or determination. The central challenge today is building the productive capacity, skills, systems, and institutions that allow independence to endure.
The security track carried a large operational burden
The Multinational Security Support Mission was authorized by the United Nations Security Council in October 2023. The mission was designed to support Haitian authorities and was planned for approximately 2,500 personnel.
The results were limited.
| Security-track figure | Label and source |
|---|---|
| About 2,500 personnel | Planned strength, reported by The Haitian Times, 28 April 2026. |
| About 1,000 officers pledged and fewer than 800 deployed by Kenya | Pledged and reported deployed personnel, The Haitian Times, 28 April 2026. |
| About $600 million annually | Estimated annual mission budget, The Haitian Times, 28 April 2026. |
| Roughly $400 million secured | Reported total support secured for the mission, largely from the United States, The Haitian Times, 28 April 2026. |
| More than 90% of Port-au-Prince under gang influence and about 1.45 million displaced | Reported conditions at the end of the mission, The Haitian Times, 28 April 2026. |
The final Kenyan contingent left Haiti on 27 April 2026, and the MSS formally ended. The mission did not reach its planned size, and its reporting shows that it ended without meeting its stated objectives.
Secondary sources attributed to Congressional Research Service product IN12331 reported that the Biden Administration announced $100 million in Department of Defense funding for the MSS and announced a further $100 million in March 2024, alongside additional State Department commitments. These figures are attributed to CRS product IN12331 as reported in secondary sources; HDNF was not able to open the CRS product directly, and the figures are therefore presented as reported rather than confirmed. CRS, “Haiti in Crisis: Developments Related to the Multinational Security Support Mission”
The security track did not operate on one simple line item. It involved projected budgets, voluntary contributions, bilateral support, equipment, logistics, transportation, facilities, and personnel costs. That distinction matters.
The successor force remains below its projected capacity
The Gang Suppression Force was authorized through U.N. Security Council Resolution 2793 on 30 September 2025. It was projected to reach 5,500 uniformed personnel, with full operational capability projected for October 2026.
As reported in the cited coverage, the force had fewer than 1,000 personnel deployed during the period discussed in The Haitian Times, 28 April 2026. The authorization and projection are documented in The Haitian Times, 30 September 2025.
A separate report attributed to Haïti Liberté, republished by the Canada-Haiti Action Network on 24 June 2026, reported approximately:
- $223 million in pledges from 13 countries;
- approximately $174 million in cash; and
- approximately $66 million disbursed.
These are reported and attributed figures from a single outlet, not official consolidated United Nations figures. They are included to show the public record’s available estimates, not as settled accounting.
The financing structure is also different from the MSS. Personnel costs depend on voluntary contributions, while logistics run through the U.N. Support Office in Haiti on assessed contributions. The categories cannot be merged into one total without a complete accounting.
The prevention track was authorized, but not fully funded
The Global Fragility Act created a dedicated Prevention and Stabilization Fund and a separate Complex Crisis Fund.
| Prevention-track figure | Label and source |
|---|---|
| $200 million per year for FY2020–FY2024 | Authorized annual level for the Prevention and Stabilization Fund, Brookings Working Paper #191, October 2024. |
| $30 million per year for FY2020–FY2024 | Authorized annual level for the Complex Crisis Fund, Brookings Working Paper #191, October 2024. |
| $100 million in FY2021 | Actual appropriation across all priority contexts, Brookings Working Paper #191, October 2024. |
| $125 million in FY2022 | Actual appropriation across all priority contexts, Brookings Working Paper #191, October 2024. |
| $135 million in FY2023 | Actual appropriation across all priority contexts, Brookings Working Paper #191, October 2024. |
| $43 million across FY2021–FY2023 | Reported allocation to Haiti, U.S. Department of State SPCPS report to Congress, 17 January 2025 and CRS R47394. |
| Approximately $14.3 million per year | Simple annual average calculated from the reported $43 million over three fiscal years. |
The $43 million is a reported allocation, not the total of every form of assistance connected to Haiti. It is also not the same kind of money as the estimated annual MSS budget. One is dedicated prevention and stabilization funding. The other is a security mission budget.
That difference must remain visible.
America's broader bilateral assistance to Haiti was larger than the dedicated prevention line. CRS reported $237.4 million actual for FY2022, $230.9 million estimated for FY2023, and $291.5 million requested for FY2024, in CRS Report R47721, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations, version updated 6 August 2024 (the figures appear in Table 2 and in Appendix Table A-2; note that an earlier version of the same report, dated 1 December 2023, does not yet contain final FY2023 figures). These figures are labelled actual, estimated, and requested, respectively. CRS also states that Global Fragility Act funds were not included in those country totals.
This is the third article in this series to carry an FY2023 Haiti figure, and the three have not been aligned. Reconciling them is part of the same exercise described below.

The reauthorization exists, but it has not moved
The Global Fragility Act is up for reauthorization. H.R. 3005, the Global Fragility Reauthorization Act, was introduced on 24 April 2025 by Representative Sara Jacobs.
According to Congress.gov and GovTrack.us, accessed 5 October 2026:
- H.R. 3005 would reauthorize the Act and extend funding authorizations through 2030.
- It has six cosponsors: three Democrats and three Republicans.
- Michael McCaul is listed as an original cosponsor.
- It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- It has had no committee action and no vote in either chamber as of 5 October 2026.
- GovTrack’s approximately 2% chance of enactment is a third-party projection, not a fact.
- An earlier bill, H.R. 9655, was introduced in the 118th Congress and did not advance.
This article reports the existence and status of proposed legislation for public information. HDNF takes no position for or against H.R. 3005, any other bill, or any proposal to reauthorize, increase, reduce, or redirect funding. HDNF does not ask readers to support or oppose legislation, to contact any public official, or to take any other action. This article does not advocate for or against reauthorizing the Global Fragility Act, or for or against any level of appropriation for any program or purpose. Readers can review the bill and its status directly through Congress.gov and GovTrack.us.
Development is the end game
HDNF’s conclusion is not that any force or government is the villain. The conclusion is simpler and more important:
Haiti’s end game is development, not relief, and not permanent enforcement.
A stabilized country still needs:
- Food production that uses land data, farmer knowledge, soil analysis, and practical agricultural advice.
- Energy independence through biodigesters, improved stoves, and community-controlled energy systems.
- Preservation skills such as canning, fermenting, and dehydrating, so harvests last beyond one season.
- Craftsmanship in woodworking, sewing, repair, and local manufacturing.
- Sustainable tourism that protects Haitian culture, communities, and natural resources while generating local income.
These are HDNF’s five development sectors. They are connected. Food supports households. Energy supports production. Skills reduce waste. Craftsmanship creates income. Tourism supports community economies.
Security can clear space. It cannot build a household’s income.

Precision agriculture turns support into durable capacity
HDNF’s Precision Agriculture Initiative, launched on 1 May 2026, puts this model into practice. It combines local farmer knowledge with satellite imagery, soil analysis, terrain mapping, and expert agricultural guidance.
The goal is direct: identify the needs of each plot and determine which crops are best suited to it.
This matters because sustainable farming depends on more than good intentions. The review by Bargout and Raizada, “Soil nutrient management in Haiti, pre-Columbus to the present day: lessons for future agricultural interventions” (Agriculture & Food Security, 2013), documents the importance of erosion control, soil cover, organic matter, composting, manuring, legumes, and practical nutrient management in Haiti. Read the review.
HDNF applies that research alongside field-level analysis and community participation. The operation is designed to become locally owned, locally operated, replicated, and expanded.
That is the long game.

What we could not verify
- The CRS product on the MSS could not be opened directly. Figures attributed to CRS IN12331 are reported pending direct confirmation.
- The GSF trust-fund figures are attributed to a single outlet, Haïti Liberté, republished by the Canada-Haiti Action Network, rather than an official consolidated source.
- No per-country FY2024 prevention-fund breakdown was found in the reviewed public sources.
- HDNF’s earlier published Haiti total for FY2021–FY2023 is being reconciled against the State Department’s reported figure by 31 October 2026.
Publishing open gaps is part of responsible public education.
Join the work that outlasts the crisis
Haiti’s future cannot be built through emergency response alone. It requires research, community, and commitment over time.
Learn more about HDNF’s Precision Agriculture Initiative, explore our food security work, and support the Haiti 2050 vision through HDNF’s development programs.
Today’s support can help build systems that serve families for generations.
Sources and methodology
Documents reviewed for this article:
- Brookings Working Paper #191 (October 2024)
- U.S. Department of State, 2025 SPCPS report to Congress (17 January 2025)
- Congressional Research Service R47394 and R47721
- Congressional Research Service IN12331 (not opened directly — figures reported pending confirmation)
- The Haitian Times (28 April 2026 and 30 September 2025)
- Haïti Liberté via the Canada-Haiti Action Network (24 June 2026)
- Bargout and Raizada, Agriculture & Food Security (2013)
- Congress.gov and GovTrack.us (accessed 5 October 2026)
Every figure in this article carries its named, dated source beside it. Figures are labelled as authorized, appropriated, requested, pledged, reported allocated, or projected, and these categories are not interchangeable.
HDNF is nonpartisan and does not endorse or oppose any candidate, political party, or administration. This article is provided for public education and is not financial, legal, or political advice.
Comments are moderated. HDNF removes hate speech, defamation, spam, threats, personal attacks, and unsupported allegations concerning identifiable people or organizations. Comments that expose private information or redirect discussion toward partisan campaigning may also be removed. Respectful, evidence-based discussion focused on Haiti’s working and middle-class communities is welcome.